“”Somewhat rational” does not mean “irrational”. There are three different ways in which something can be said to be rational. (1) That reason can be applied to it. Duh, reason can be applied to everything. (2) That it’s prosecuted by means of reason. Ethical thought sometimes proceeds by means of reason, and sometimes not. Hence, “somewhat rational”. (3) That applying reason to it doesn’t show up inconsistencies. Perhaps some people have (near enough) perfectly consistent ethical positions. Certainly most people don’t. It’s not unheard of for philosophers to advocate embracing that inconsistency. But generally there’s some degree of consistency, and sufficiently gross inconsistencies can prompt revision. Hence, again, “somewhat rational”.”
The second is the only situation by which somewhat rational makes sense, but was not the context of the argument, which was, after all, about moral systems, and not moral thoughts—as for the third, inconsistent consistency, I think you will agree, is not consistency at all.
Since we’re having a conversation, I might hazard a suggestion that it is what you are saying that is giving me the impressions of what it is you think. And I stated my reasons in each case why I thought you were thinking as you were—if you wish to address me, address the reasons I gave, so I might know in what way I am failing to understand what it is you are attempting to communicate.
“”Somewhat rational” does not mean “irrational”. There are three different ways in which something can be said to be rational. (1) That reason can be applied to it. Duh, reason can be applied to everything. (2) That it’s prosecuted by means of reason. Ethical thought sometimes proceeds by means of reason, and sometimes not. Hence, “somewhat rational”. (3) That applying reason to it doesn’t show up inconsistencies. Perhaps some people have (near enough) perfectly consistent ethical positions. Certainly most people don’t. It’s not unheard of for philosophers to advocate embracing that inconsistency. But generally there’s some degree of consistency, and sufficiently gross inconsistencies can prompt revision. Hence, again, “somewhat rational”.”
The second is the only situation by which somewhat rational makes sense, but was not the context of the argument, which was, after all, about moral systems, and not moral thoughts—as for the third, inconsistent consistency, I think you will agree, is not consistency at all.
Since we’re having a conversation, I might hazard a suggestion that it is what you are saying that is giving me the impressions of what it is you think. And I stated my reasons in each case why I thought you were thinking as you were—if you wish to address me, address the reasons I gave, so I might know in what way I am failing to understand what it is you are attempting to communicate.